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Introduction
Competition among physicians is widespread. Almost every country has a market-based allocation of physician services, though the scope for competition may vary according to government regulations. In particular, the extent to which prices of physician services are set administratively or determined in the market di¤ers across public and private health care systems. In this paper we study the e¤ect of non-price competition among physicians on their service provision in a National Health Service (NHS), and how this relationship depends on the …nancial incentives provided by the physicians'remuneration schemes.
Despite the widespread presence of competition in physician markets, the empirical evidence on its impact on physicians'service provision is surprisingly scarce. 1 There are only a few papers, which we discuss below, that provide compelling evidence on the causal relationship between competition and physician behaviour. A main reason for this is that market structure is endogenous, which makes it hard to obtain plausible exogenous variation in the degree of competition.
A standard regression analysis of market concentration on physicians'service provision, as used by most of the existing literature on physician markets, will yield biased estimates. While instrumental variable approaches could be employed to deal with the endogeneity problem, the lack of data in physician markets has made this di¢ cult. 2 In this paper we propose a novel approach to identify the impact of competition on physicians' service provision. More precisely, we take advantage of the fact that many General Practitioners (GPs), in addition to their regular o¢ ce practice, work in local primary care emergency centres (PCECs). At the PCECs, the physician-patient matching is random, implying that the GPs face exogenous demand and thus no competition for patients. However, at the GPs' own practice, the matching is a result of patient choice and the GPs should realise that their treatment decisions will a¤ect both the probability that the patient chooses to remain on the GPs'list in the future, and also, through reputation e¤ects, the probability that new patients will choose to be listed with the GP. Since the data allows us to observe the same GP in di¤erent competitive environments, being exposed (in own practice) or not (in emergency centre) to competition, we are in principle able to isolate the e¤ect on competition on GP behaviour in a way that allows 1 See the review by Gaynor and Town (2011) . 2 For more details, see Gaynor and Town (2011) .
us to make causal inferences.
A key issue, though, is to control for other factors (than competition) that may in ‡uence physician behaviour in the two competitive environments. To do so, we exploit rich administrative data with detailed patient-level information in Norway from 2006 to 2014. From these data, which basically cover the whole population in Norway, we select the ten most frequent acute diagnoses treated by GPs. As outcome variable, we use certi…cation of (paid) sick leave, which is a highly frequent and standardised 'treatment choice'made by GPs for acute diagnoses.
The detailed data allow us to estimate high-dimensional …xed-e¤ect models using only within patient and GP variation. This implies that we control for all time-invariant unobserved (and observed) patient and GP heterogeneity. We also include diagnosis …xed-e¤ects and control for time trend, as well as a wide set of potentially time-varying patient and GP characteristics.
Our key …nding is that GPs are more likely to issue sick leave to patients that visit them at their own practice than at the emergency centre. We also …nd that, when exposed to competition, GPs with an activity-based (fee-for-service and capitation) contract are much more likely to o¤er sick leave than GPs with a …xed-salary contract. These results are economically signi…cant. In our most preferred model, GPs with an activity-based contract are 12 percentage points more likely to o¤er a sick leave at their own practice than at the emergency centre, whereas the equivalent …gure for GPs on …xed-salary contracts is 7.5 percentage points. These …ndings are (in qualitative terms) highly robust across a large set of speci…cations and sensitivity tests. We therefore conclude that competition does in ‡uence physician behaviour, and that this e¤ect is strongly reinforced by …nancial incentives (i.e., activity-based remuneration of physician services).
To develop economic intuition for the results, we construct a dynamic model of GPs'choices of sick-listing practice styles when patients di¤er in illness severity and thus the need for a sick leave. In the model patients always (weakly) prefer a sick leave certi…cate irrespective of illness severity, as it is optional to make use of it. This implies that, under competition, GPs can increase future demand by adopting a more lenient sick-listing practice style. Assuming GPs are semi-altruistic and that deviating from medical sick-listing guidelines (i.e., being too lenient) is costly for the GP, we show that the e¤ect of exposing GPs to competition crucially depends on the GPs' remuneration scheme. For GPs with an activity-based (fee-for-service or capitation) 3 contract, competition always induces the GPs to be more lenient in terms of sick listing. For GPs with a …xed-salary contract, the e¤ect of competition is a priori ambiguous. If GPs are mainly pro…t motivated, competition induces the GPs to adopt a stricter practice style in order to avoid (rather than attract) patients. However, the reverse is true if GPs are su¢ ciently altruistic and thus put a larger weight on patients'bene…t from obtaining a sick leave relative to the costs of being too lenient.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we review the relevant literature. In Section 3 we present the Norwegian primary care market. In Section 4 we develop a dynamic model for GPs'sick listing practice and derive predictions for the empirical analysis.
In Section 5 we present our data and provide some descriptive statistics. In Section 6 we explain our empirical strategy and in Section 7 we present our empirical results. In Section 8 we present several robustness checks and extensions in order to validate our results and empirical strategy. Section 9 concludes the paper.
Related literature
The economic literature on the market for physician services is extensive. A majority of work is on 'physician agency'that focuses on the role of asymmetric information in the relationship between patients and physicians and physician-induced demand. 3 There is also a large and related literature on physician incentives and payment schemes that studies the e¤ects of fee changes on physicians'supply of medical services. 4 However, the literature on competition per se in physician markets is surprisingly sparse despite its widespread presence. 5 There exists an early literature on the e¤ects of competition on pricing of physician services.
Most of this literature tends to use the number of physicians per capita within a geographic area as measure of competition, and exploit across-area variation to estimate the e¤ect of competition on service prices. 6 More recent papers use instead measures of market concentration, such 3 See, for instance, the review by McGuire (2000) and the recent paper by Jacobson et al. (2013) . 4 See, for instance, the seminal work by Gruber and Owings (1996) and the more recent work by Devlin and Sarma (2008) , Clemens and Gottlieb (2014) and Brekke et al. (2016) . 5 For a review, see Gaynor and Town (2011) . 6 See, for instance, the seminal work by Pauly and Satterthwaite (1981) who use data on 92 US metropolitan areas. They …nd that areas with more physicians per capita have lower prices.
as the Her…ndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), to estimate the impact on service prices. 7 A key problem is that these measures of competition are endogenous and thus yield biased results. A recent paper by Dunn and Shapiro (2014) deal with this problem by using predicted (rather than actual) …xed-travel-time HHI, as used by Kessler and McClellan (2000) for competition in hospital markets. Linking these concentration measures to health insurance claims in the US, they …nd that physicians in more concentrated markets charge higher service prices. Another paper is Gravelle et al. (2016) who study the impact of competition on consultation prices charged by GPs in Australia. The degree of competition is measured by distance between GPs, and they use within area (rather than across area) variation to identify the e¤ects of competition on GPs'consultation prices. They argue that the areas are su¢ ciently small to account for the fact that GPs' locational decisions are endogenous. They …nd that GPs with more distant competitors charge higher prices and a smaller proportion of their patients make no out-ofpocket payment. Our paper di¤ers from this strand of literature in that we focus on the impact on non-price competition variables (i.e., sick listing) and take a di¤erent approach to obtain exogenous variation in the degree of competition (i.e., within GP variation in competition and service provision).
The number of studies on the impact of competition on physicians'service provision is much more limited than the above-mentioned literature on physician pricing. A recent paper by Santos et al. (2016) provide evidence from the UK that patients respond to quality di¤erences among GPs and are willing to travel further to higher quality practices. While this is not a direct test of the e¤ects of competition, the study shows that GPs face higher demand if they improve their quality. There are a few papers that use 'shortage of patients' as competition measure, where shortage of patients is de…ned by whether the GP has open vacancies on their patient lists. The idea is simply that patients with closed list are competing less intense than those with open lists. For instance, Iversen and Lurås (2000) and Iversen (2004) show that Norwegian GPs who experience shortage of patients provide more services and thus obtain higher income per patient than their unconstrained colleagues (with full patient lists). A similar approach is taken by Iversen and Ma (2011) who …nd that more intense competition, measured either by whether the GPs'patient list is open or by the GPs'desired list size, leads to more diagnostic radiology referrals. Finally, Godager et al. (2015a) …nd that increased competition, measured either by the number of open primary physician practices or HHI, has negligible or small positive e¤ects on referrals overall. Although it might seem plausible that GPs compete less aggressively in local markets with few open lists, the competition measure is clearly endogenous and thus likely to su¤er from the same endogeneity problem as the use of market concentration measures, such as the HHI. Our paper di¤ers from this strand of literature in that we do not consider the relationship between primary and secondary care and the gatekeeping role of GPs. 8 More importantly, we propose a di¤erent approach to identifying the e¤ect of competition on GPs' service provision, i.e., within GP variation rather than across GP or local market variation.
Finally, we should mention a closely related study by Markussen and Røed (2017) . They study, as we do, the GPs propensity to issue sickness certi…cation to patients using Norwegian administrative data. Their study consists of three separate parts. First, they identify each GPs' degree of 'gatekeeper leniency' at each point in time by using worker (patient) …xed e¤ects, which is identi…ed by worker movements between GPs and between sick leave and work. Second, they examine the extent to which workers choose GPs that are more lenient by estimating a conditional logit model, where the choice set is identi…ed by the observed GP choices among other workers in the same local area. Third, they examine whether GPs adjust their gatekeeper leniency in response to ‡uctuations in demand or in costs of losing patients. This is done using a …xed e¤ect model where the e¤ects are identi…ed on the basis of changes in the local competitive environment or in the GP's remuneration structure. Their results show that patients tend to choose GPs that have a more lenient sick-listing practice and GPs tend to become more lenient in local markets with stronger competition. While this study reports similar results as we do, they use conventional measures of competition, such as the number or share of GPs with open lists (vacancies), the number of GPs per capita in an area, or the share of patients with a recent GP switch. Our contribution is to propose a di¤erent approach to identify the causal impact of competition on sick-listing by exploiting within GP variation in exposure to competition.
Institutional background
In the Norwegian National Health Service (NHS), primary care provision is the responsibility of the municipalities, although funding and regulation are to a large extent made by the central government. Since the implementation of the Regular General Practitioner Scheme (Fastlegereformen in Norwegian) in 2001, each inhabitant of Norway has the right to be listed with a GP. 9 Patients are free to choose their GP (if the GP has vacant patient slots), and can switch GP (without stating any particular reason) at most twice per year. 10 In contrast, the GPs are not allowed to select their patients. GPs are free to choose their patient list size in the interval between 500 and 2500 patients (average list size is around 1200 patients). About 95% of GPs are self-employed, private physicians contracting with municipalities, with the remaining GPs being directly employed by the municipalities. The payment system for self-employed GPs is a combination of a capitation fee (covered by the municipalities) and fee-for-service (covered partly by the public social security agency and partly by the patients), where the fee-for-service part constitutes around 70% of the GPs'total income. 11 On the other hand, GPs employed by the municipality are paid a …xed salary.
Municipalities are also responsible for the emergency primary health care for their inhabitants (and visitors). These services are o¤ered either at a GP's o¢ ce or at PCECs, which often serve several municipalities. During evenings, nights and weekends, all emergency contacts are directed to these centres. In larger municipalities, PCECs also o¤er services at daytime. During ordinary opening hours, all GPs are obliged to accept and assess patients in need of emergency care in their own practice. In principle, when below the age of 60, GPs are also obliged to provide emergency care at PCECs, though it is possible to apply for exemption based on health or social reasons. In practice, more than 50% of the GPs work at PCECs.
Approximately half of the consultations taking place at PCECs are with a regular GP and the rest are covered by locums and junior doctors from hospitals. When working in an emer- 9 In the following, 'GP'refers to primary care doctors that are contracted or employed by the municipalities, i.e., GPs within the NHS.
1 0 When choosing a GP, patients are not restricted to GPs located in their own municipalities. In practice, though, the share of patients listed with GPs outside their own municipalities is very low. 1 1 Some municipalities also o¤er contracts where the municipality provides premises, equipment and/or sta¤ for the private practice. In return, the municipality keeps the capitation fee while the GP receives the fee-for-service income. gency centre during daytime or in the evenings, the vast majority of GPs are paid according to the same fee-for-service schedule as the one used for contracted GPs in their regular practice (Godager et al., 2015b) . The PCECs are mainly visited by patients with infections, musculoskeletal problems, injuries and other physical disorder, though approximately 5% is related to mental health problems. Epidemiological research has found that, compared to many other countries, primary care emergency services are frequently used in Norway, and often in relation to conditions that could just as well have been treated by the patient's regular GP. The reason for this pattern appears to be relatively poor access to the GP during daytime (Sandvik et al., 2012) . A key feature of the consultations taking place at the emergency centres is that patients are randomly matched with doctors, which we exploit as an identi…cation strategy in our empirical analysis. The implications of this will be further discussed in Section 6, where we describe our empirical strategy.
An important function that GPs are entrusted with is gatekeeping to the Norwegian sickness bene…t system, in which workers are entitled to a 100% replacement rate up to a maximum threshold (approximately e61,000 or $64,700) from the …rst day of sick leave and until one year for the same sickness spell. The …rst 16 days of sick leave are paid by the employer, while sickness bene…t beyond the …rst 16 days is covered by the public social security agency. Self-certi…cation can be used for the …rst three or eight days of an absence spell depending on employer. Beyond that period, eligibility for sickness bene…t requires certi…cation from a GP who must assess the ability to work (full or part time) and make a decision about sickness certi…cation based on this evaluation. The Norwegian Health Directorate has issued sickness certi…cation guidelines in order to help standardise the certi…cation practice across GPs. 12 Sickness certi…cates can be issued both at a regular GP practice and at a PCEC and the procedures for issuing such certi…cates are identical in both cases.
A dynamic model of GP practice styles
In this section we develop a dynamic model of GPs'choices of sick-listing practice styles, where we make sure that the model is su¢ ciently rich to incorporate the key institutional details of 1 2 These guidelines are available at https://helsedirektoratet.no/retningslinjer/sykmelderveileder. 8 the Norwegian primary care market. The model is used to make theoretical predictions about how competition is likely to a¤ect sick-listing rates, and how this relationship is likely to depend on GP payment schemes.
Suppose that a total mass of 1 in…nitely lived workers are uniformly distributed on a line segment L = [0; 1]. In every period t, each worker falls (temporarily) sick with illness severity s, which is assumed to be perfectly negatively correlated with work ability, and which is drawn (independently in each period) from a uniform distribution with support [0; 1]. Each time a worker falls sick, he can visit a GP who, in addition to prescribing an appropriate treatment, might issue a sickness certi…cate. We assume that a GP can correctly observe patients'illness severity and will issue a sickness certi…cate if the severity is above a threshold level. More speci…cally, we assume that GP i issues a sickness certi…cate to every patient with severity 
for all s. Thus, higher illness severity implies lower patient utility, but, for a given severity level, a patient always prefers to get a sickness certi…cate. 14 Suppose there are two GPs in the market, one located at each endpoint of L. Including travelling costs, expected utility for a worker located at z and visiting GP i, located at z i , is 15
where > 0 is the marginal travelling cost. With little loss of generality, we parameterise the sub-utility functions as follows: a (s) = s and b (s) = 1 s, where 2 (0; 1). Expected utility in (1) is then given by
We assume that the parameters , and are such that U i (z) > 0 for all z and i , which implies full market coverage; i.e., that every worker who falls sick always prefers to visit a GP. 16 Suppose that, at each point on the line, a share of workers can choose which GP to attend, whereas each of the remaining share 1 is randomly allocated to one of the GPs each time they fall sick. If all workers are able to correctly observe the practice style of each GP, the worker who is indi¤erent between GP i and GP j is located at
This implies further that the potential demand for GP i from the segment of patients who make a choice of GP is given by b x. However, since practice style is di¢ cult to observe ex ante, it is unrealistic to assume that a GP who chooses a particular practice style will immediately realise his potential demand. We assume instead that patients'beliefs about the practice styles of the two GPs evolve sluggishly over time through repeated interactions and reputation. More speci…cally, we assume that, at each point in time, only a fraction 2 (0; 1) of patients become aware of changes in GP practice styles. This implies that only a fraction of any potential change in demand is realised at each point in time. Let actual demand of GP i at time t be given by
whereas potential demand is given by
where b x is given by (3) . Analytically, the law of motion of actual demand is given by
1 6 This requires < 1 2
(1 ) and < 1 2 (1 ) which is equivalent to
Suppose that the net income of GP i at time t is a linear combination of …xed-salary income and fee-for-service income, given by
where w is a …xed wage and p is the consultation fee net of monetary costs per consultation, which for simplicity are assumed to be constant. 17 In addition to net income, we also assume that each GP has semi-altruistic preferences and therefore cares, to some extent, about patient utility; that there is a (non-monetary) e¤ort cost of patient consultations; and that GPs su¤er a disutility from deviating from the o¢ cial sick-listing guidelines. The aggregate utility of patients attending GP i at time t is given by
The payo¤ of GP i at time t is then assumed to be given by
where measures the degree of altruism towards the patients, c is the (constant) marginal cost of consultation e¤ort, and where the last term re ‡ects the GP's disutility of adopting a practice style that deviates from the o¢ cial guidelines. In order to make sure that the GP's participation constraint is satis…ed for all 2 [0; 1], we assume that p > c.
We consider a dynamic game where the two GPs simultaneously (and independently) choose their practice styles (i.e., i and j ) at each point in (continuous) time over an in…nite time horizon. This is a 2-player di¤erential game with practice style as the control variable and demand as the state variable. For analytical convenience, we choose the open-loop solution as our game-theoretic solution concept. Here it is assumed that each GP knows the initial state of the system but cannot observe the other GP's practice style, and thus potential demand, in subsequent periods. This implies that each GP computes his optimal plan (i.e., a sequence of practice styles over time) at the beginning of the game and then sticks to it forever. Thus, the optimal choice depends only on time, time-invariant parameters and initial conditions. 18 De…ning as the rate of time preference, the dynamic optimisation problem of GP i is given
subject to the dynamic constraint 19
and the initial condition
Let i (t) denote the current-value co-state variable associated with the state equation (12) . The current-value Hamiltonian is then given by 20
The optimal solution must satisfy the following three conditions:
in addition to the transversality condition lim t!+1 e t i (t) x (t) = 0. The second-order conditions are satis…ed if the Hamiltonian is concave in its control and state variables, which requires
Time-di¤erentiation of (15) yields
Substituting in (18) for i from (16), x from (17) and using i from (15), we arrive at
which, together with (17), describes the dynamics of the equilibrium. 21 The symmetric steady-state GP practice style is found by setting i = 0, i = j and x = 1 2 , which yields
where := 1 2
(1 ) 2 > 0 (by the assumption of full market coverage). In the following, we restrict attention to the steady-state outcome and ask two related questions: (i) How does the degree of competition a¤ect GP practice styles? (ii) How does the e¤ect in (i) depend on the GP payment scheme?
Using the share of patients who choose GP as the measure of competition, the benchmark case of no competition is given by = 0. In this case, the steady-state GP practice style is given When GPs cannot a¤ect demand through their choice of practice style, there exists only one incentive for GPs to adopt a practice style that deviates from the o¢ cial guidelines, namely altruistic concern for patient utility at the intensive margin. A more lenient practice style ( > 0) implies that the expected utility of patients who are allocated to the GP increases, and a semi-altruistic GP derives some bene…ts from this. These marginal bene…ts are optimally traded o¤ against the marginal disutility of deviating from the o¢ cial guidelines. Thus, semialtruistic GPs will choose a strictly positive value of , whereas purely pro…t-oriented GPs will set = 0. It is worth noting that, in the absence of competition, GP practice styles do not depend on the payment scheme for GPs.
The case of free patient choice, which implies competition between the GPs, is characterised by = 1. The e¤ect of competition on GP practice styles in the steady state is then given by
The sign of this expression -which is a priori ambiguous -depends on the sign of the numerator, which consists of two terms. The …rst and second term capture the e¤ect of competition on, respectively, the GPs'…nancial and altruistic incentives for the choice of practice style.
We can isolate the …nancial incentives by considering the case of purely pro…t-oriented GPs (i.e., = 0). In this case, we see that the sign of depends crucially on the GP payment scheme. The e¤ect of competition on the GPs'propensity to issue sickness certi…cates is negative ( < 0) under …xed-salary contracts ( = 1) and positive ( > 0) under fee-for-service contracts ( = 0). More generally, competition leads to a more lenient GP practice style if the …nancial incentives for attracting more patients are su¢ ciently high-powered (i.e., if is su¢ ciently low). If these incentives do not exist, which is the case under …xed-salary contracts, a purely pro…t-oriented GP will choose a practice style in the steady state that is stricter than the o¢ cial guidelines (i.e., < 0) in an attempt to reduce demand and thereby save consultation e¤ort costs. 23 The e¤ect of GP altruism is captured by the second term in the numerator of (22) and contributes unambiguously positive. The reason is that competition allows for patient utility e¤ects of GP practice styles at the extensive margin. By adopting a more lenient practice style, a GP can attract more patients and thereby increase the total utility of the patients treated.
Under fee-for-service payment ( = 0), this e¤ect will reinforce the positive relationship between competition and the propensity to issue sickness certi…cates. Under …xed-salary contracts ( = 1), GP altruism introduces a counteracting e¤ect. If the altruistic gain of increased patient utility at the extensive margin is higher than the marginal consultation cost, competition leads to a more lenient GP practice style ( > 0) also for GPs on …xed-salary contracts.
Finally, notice that the magnitude of the competition e¤ect on GP practice styles depends on the size of the potential demand response to a more lenient practice style (measured by (1 )) and by how fast actual demand adjusts to such a change in practice style (measured by ).
The above described results are summarised as follows:
Proposition 1 (i) Under fee-for-service contracts, competition always leads to a more lenient GP practice style.
(ii) Under …xed-salary contracts, competition leads to a more lenient (stricter)
GP practice style if the degree of altruism is su¢ ciently strong (weak). (iii) When facing competition, a GP on fee-for-service contract is always more lenient than a GP on …xed-salary contract.
Data and descriptive statistics
Data on GPs and their patients are derived from the Norwegian Health Economics Administration (HELFO), which is responsible for the Norwegian primary care patient list scheme. 24 For each patient contact (consultation), whether at the GP's regular o¢ ce or at an emergency centre, the GP sends an invoice to HELFO. The register includes information on patients'age and gender, date and time of contact, diagnosis according to the ICPC-2-diagnosis code and codes from a detailed tari¤ scheme for type of contact (including a tari¤ for issuing sickness certi…cates). Notably, each invoice also states whether the GP is remunerated by fee-for ser- 
Sample
We restrict attention to the 10 most frequent diagnoses among employed patients attending PCECs in the period 2007-2014. 25 These are listed in Table 1 , which also contains information on the total number of visits at emergency centres per diagnosis.
[ Table 1 here]
From HELFO we have extracted information on all consultations, whether at a regular GP practice or at an emergency centre, where the patient was diagnosed with one of these 10 diagnoses. This amounts to a total of 5,882,822 visits over the period 2007-2014. Since we focus on GPs'sick-listing practice we only include patients who were employed at the time of consultation, which reduces the total number of visits by approximately 25 percent. Furthermore, we exclude from the sample visits to physicians not registered as a regular GP 26 and visits (at a GP o¢ ce) to another regular GP than the one the patient is listed with. 27 These two categories constitute roughly 25 and 30 percent, respectively, of all visits. 28 A potential remaining problem is related to visits which result in emergency hospital admissions. In these cases, the sickness certi…cate might be issued at the hospital. In order to exclude such cases we link our data on primary care visits to data from the Norwegian Patient Register (NPR), which contains (weekly) information on all admissions to secondary care in Norway. Based on this information, we have excluded visits from patients who are registered with a hospital stay in the same week as the primary care consultation.
In a few cases, a GP is registered both with fee-for-service and salary in a given month. If more than 5% of the GP's consultations are remunerated di¤erently from the dominant consultation type, we exclude the GP's consultations for the relevant month. This could for instance happen if the GP changes practice during a month. It concerns less than a half percent of all consultations.
[ Table 2 here]
We also exclude consultations at PCECs that take place during the night (which constitute less than 3 percent of all consultations). This exclusion is an attempt to reduce unobservable patient and GP heterogeneity across consultation types. On the patient side, consultations at emergency centres during the night is likely to involve more high-severity patients, while on the GP side, excluding night-time consultations will exclude most of the PCEC consultations where GPs are paid a …xed salary, ensuring a more homogeneous remuneration scheme (fee-for-service)
for the remaining PCEC consultations in the sample. 29 Furthermore, we exclude consultations where the GP is matched with one of his own list patients at an emergency centre, since it is reasonable to assume the GP has incentives to behave di¤erently in such cases. 30 Finally,
we have dropped a small number of patients with missing observations on some explanatory variables. Table 2 contains information on the relative size of each of the excluded consultation categories for each of the ten diagnoses considered. 31 Our …nal sample contains almost 2.5 million consultations.
Variables
In line with our empirical strategy (to be further explained in the next section), we classify all consultations in our …nal sample into three di¤erent categories: (i) consultations where the patient visits her own regular GP and this GP is self-employed and paid by capitation and fee-for-service, (ii) consultations where the patient visits her own regular GP and this GP is employed on a …xed-salary contract, and (iii) consultations which takes place at a municipal emergency centre. These categories constitute approximately 88%, 3% and 9%, respectively, of the total number of consultations. For each consultation we also know whether a sickness certi…cate has been issued and whether the consultation is a prolonged one. 32 [Figures 1a and 1b here] Figure 1a shows the frequency of each diagnosis in each category of primary care consultations. For many diagnoses, their frequency is quite similar across consultation categories.
Within this set of diagnoses, we see that upper respiratory infection is the most common diagnosis at GP o¢ ces and almost equally frequent at emergency centres. On the other hand, laceration/cut is much more common at emergency centres. These patient sample di¤erences will be taken care of in the empirical analysis where we control for diagnosis. Notice, however, that the descriptive statistics on the rate of sick listing across the three categories of consultations, as depicted in Figure 1b , show a very consistent pattern. For every single diagnosis, the sick-listing rate is highest in consultations with a regular GP on fee-for-service payment and lowest in consultations at emergency centres.
We also include a relatively large set of GP and patient characteristics as control variables.
All variables are listed and de…ned in Table A .1 in the Appendix. In Table 3 we report the mean values of all variables (summed over all diagnoses) for each of the three consultation categories.
Patients at the emergency center had a lower number of visits to a GP or an emergency centre the previous year, but they are also somewhat younger than the average patient at the GP o¢ ce. For most of the other variables, the descriptive statistics show relatively small and nonsystematic di¤erences across consultation categories. As expected, since regular GPs above the 3 2 The standard time for a consultation is 20 minutes, but the consultation can be prolonged by the physician.
age of 60 are automatically exempted from the obligation to work at emergency centres, the average GP age is somewhat lower for consultations taking place there.
[ Table 3 here]
Empirical strategy
The (twofold) aim of our empirical analysis is (i) to estimate the causal relationship between the degree of competition a GP is exposed to and his propensity to issue sickness certi…cates to his patients, and (ii) to assess how this relationship depends on the GP payment scheme (…xed salary versus fee-for-service). Our theoretical analysis predicts that more competition will lead to a higher sick-listing rate if GP payment is based on fee-for-service, whereas the e¤ect of competition on the sick-listing rate of …xed-salary GPs is a priori ambiguous and, if positive, smaller than the e¤ect on the sick-listing rate of fee-for-service GPs.
The key challenge for empirical identi…cation is to create an exogenous measure of competition intensity. Our strategy here is to exploit the fact that the consultation-speci…c matching of patients to physicians is based on patient choice at regular GP practices, whereas it is completely random at emergency centres. This di¤erence in 'matching technology'has clear implications for the nature of the competitive environment the GPs …nd themselves in when they work in their own practice or in an emergency centre. When patient-physician matching is random, as is the case in an emergency centre, the GP cannot in ‡uence his future demand, which is exogenous.
This implies that the GP is not exposed to any competition for patients and is equivalent to the case of = 0 in the theory model. On the other hand, when working in his own practice, where physician-patient matching is a result of patient choice, the GP should realise that his treatment decisions (or 'practice style') will a¤ect both the probability that the patient chooses to remain on the GP's list in the future, and also, through reputation e¤ects, the probability that new patients will choose to be listed with the GP. This implies that the GP is exposed to competition for patients and is equivalent to the case of = 1 in the theory model. Since the data allows us to observe the same GP in di¤erent competitive environments, being exposed (in own practice) or not (in emergency centre) to competition, we are in principle able to isolate the e¤ect of competition on GP behaviour in a way that allows us to make causal inferences.
In order to estimate the e¤ect of competition on physician behaviour, we employ the following high-dimensional …xed e¤ect model where we control for all time-invariant characteristics of patients and physicians using the Stata module reghdfe (Correia, 2014):
where the dependent variable y ijt is equal to 1 if GP j issues a sickness certi…cate to patient i at time t, and equal to zero otherwise. According to (23), we have the following distinct sources of variation in the dependent variable:
1. Type of consultation (T ype ijt ) according to the three previously de…ned categories.
2. Observed time-varying exogenous characteristics of patients and physicians (X ijt ).
3. Time-invariant patient heterogeneity ( i ).
4. Time-invariant physician heterogeneity ( j ).
5. Period-speci…c e¤ects (dummy variables for year, month, day of week and hour) common to all patients and physicians (! t ).
6. Unexplained random variation (" ijt ).
Our explanatory variable of main interest is type of consultation. In the analysis we use visits to emergency centres as the baseline category, which implies that the estimated parameter vector measures the e¤ect of exposure to competition on physicians'propensity to issue sickness certi…cates, with separate parameter estimates depending on whether physicians have …xed salaries or fee-for-service payments in the environment where they are exposed to competition.
GPs working at emergency centres may well di¤er systematically from GPs who do not on un- 
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A remaining potential estimation problem, though, is that patients visiting an emergency centre might di¤er from patients visiting a regular GP. Even in a regression model where we include patient, GP and time …xed e¤ects, and where we also control for a large set of timevarying patient and physician characteristics, the dependent variable is likely to be correlated with the error term due to unobserved patient characteristics. However, the interpretation of the estimation results is greatly enhanced by the fact that, although it is hard to know the size of the patient selection bias, the direction of the bias appears to be clear. Controlled for observable patient characteristics, there is no reason to believe that regular GP consultations involve sicker patients, on average, than consultations at emergency centres. On the contrary, it seems highly reasonable to claim that the average severity level is higher at PCECs. Although we cannot directly observe patient severity, this conjecture is backed by the observation that, for every diagnosis considered, the share of patients who are sent to hospital after a primary care consultation is considerably higher for emergency centre consultations than for regular GP consultations. 33 We will return to this issue when discussing the robustness of our empirical results presented in the next section.
Eq. (23) is our preferred model, but we also report results from estimations of OLS models with time-…xed and diagnoses-…xed e¤ects, as well as from models adding GP or patient …xed e¤ects. When estimating GP and/or patient …xed e¤ects speci…cations, we follow Correia (2015) and drop singleton observations (i.e., GPs or patients for whom there is only one observation) in order to ensure proper inference and improve computational e¢ ciency in our …xed-e¤ect regressions.
Results
Our main regression results are presented in Table 4 , which displays results from the estimation of four di¤erent versions of (23) . As a benchmark for comparison, estimates based on pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) are reported in Column 1 of Table 4 . If we compare OLS results with raw data sickness certi…cation rates (Table 3) , the di¤erences in sick-listing propensity across consultation categories are much less when we control for observable GP and patient characteristics as well as time …xed e¤ects. In particular, controlling for diagnosis is important, as could be expected from the descriptive statistics (Figures 1a and 1b) . Table 4 show the estimates from models with physician …xed e¤ects and patient …xed e¤ects, respectively. In the model with physician …xed e¤ects, identi…cation of the competition e¤ect is based on observations of the same physician both in his own practice and at an emergency centre. On the other hand, in the model with patient …xed e¤ects, identi…cation is based on observations of the same patient visiting her regular GP and visiting an emergency centre. Finally, in Column 4 we report estimates from our preferred empirical model with two-way (physician and patient) …xed e¤ects, as speci…ed in (23).
Columns 2 and 3 in
[ Table 4 here]
For our independent variables of interest, the point estimates are qualitatively similar in all four models. When a physician works in a more competitive environment (i.e., in his own practice instead of at an emergency centre), the physician's propensity to issue sickness certi…cates is signi…cantly higher. Furthermore, this e¤ect is signi…cantly stronger if the physician has …nancial incentives to compete for patients (i.e., if the physician's income in his own practice is based on capitation and fee-for-service rather than a …xed salary). These e¤ects are estimated with a great deal of precision. In our most preferred model, exposure to competition increases the probability of sick listing by 7.5 percentage points if the GP is on a …xed-salary contract, and by more than 12 percentage points if the GP is on a fee-for-service contract. 34 The estimated coe¢ cients for the other covariates are all relatively small in magnitude. 35 The estimated e¤ect of competition on the sick-listing practice of fee-for-service GPs, who have …nancial incentives to attract patients, serves as a strong con…rmation of the prediction from our theoretical model. The …nding of a much stronger e¤ect for these GPs than for …xed-salary GPs is also in accordance with the theoretical analysis. However, our theory predicts that the sign of the competition e¤ect is a priori ambiguous for …xed-salary GPs, with a positive (negative) e¤ect if the degree of altruism is su¢ ciently strong (weak). The empirical …nding of a signi…cantly positive e¤ect also for this group of GPs suggests, in light of the theory, that the degree of altruism among …xed-salary GPs is relatively high. This might be partly explained by a selection e¤ect that is not fully accounted for in our empirical models. When the Regular General Practitioner Scheme was introduced in 2001, the GPs who were already on a …xed-salary contract were given the right to keep their position as employed GPs earning a …xed salary. Thus, the type of GP (fee-for-service vs. …xed salary) is to some extent a result of the GPs'own choice and we cannot rule out the possibility that the two types of GPs di¤er along some unobservable dimension. One possible self-selection criterion, which seems intuitively plausible, is that the more pro…t-oriented GPs opted for a self-employment contract (capitation and fee-for-service)
whereas the more altruistic ones opted to remain on a …xed-salary contract.
Robustness and extensions
In this section we assess the validity of our results in three di¤erent ways. First, we address some potential selection biases in our main analysis and check whether our results are robust to di¤erent sample selection criteria that correct for these biases. Second, we explore whether our identifying strategy produces heterogeneous e¤ects along dimensions that measure the intensity of competition. If the e¤ects are stronger in contexts where competition is more intense, this provides con…rmation that our empirical strategy is really capturing a competition e¤ect. Finally, we design a placebo test where we compare GPs'practice styles at their own GP practices with the practice style towards their own list patients at the emergency centres, which is a way to eliminate the competition e¤ect which, we claim, is explaining our main results (Table 4 ).
All results in this section are derived from our preferred empirical model with two-way (GP and patient) …xed e¤ects.
Selection bias
As mentioned in Section 6, our results might be a¤ected by patient selection bias due to unobserved systematic di¤erences between patients who visit an emergency centre and patients who visit their regular GP. However, as previously argued, such a bias -if it still remains after con-trolling for both time-varying and time-invariant heterogeneity -is likely to be in the direction of sicker patients attending emergency centres, which implies that, absent the competition e¤ect, the rate of sick listing should be higher at emergency centres than at regular GP practices. Thus, the fact that we …nd signi…cantly lower sick-listing rates at emergency centres suggests that we are, if anything, underestimating the positive e¤ect of competition on physicians'propensity to issue sickness certi…cates.
However, we can also identify three other potential biases that work in the opposite direction.
The …rst of these is related to the fact that the degree of familiarity between physician and patient is likely to be higher in a regular GP consultation, at least on average. This might have two di¤erent e¤ects on the physician's decision of whether or not to issue a sickness certi…cate.
First, higher familiarity is likely to improve diagnosis accuracy; i.e., the better the GP knows the patient, the more likely he is to observe the true severity level of the patient. However, there is no particular reason to believe that this will create a bias in our analysis. For any given GP practice style (i.e., sick-listing threshold), the inability to diagnose accurately can create two types of mistakes: the GP issues sickness certi…cates to patients who should not have been sick listed, and patients who should have been sick listed do not obtain a sickness certi…cate.
Improved diagnosis accuracy will reduce both types of mistakes and there is no a priori reason to believe that the net e¤ect is systematically di¤erent from zero. However, higher familiarity between physician and patient might also make the physician more prone to give the patient a sickness certi…cate in borderline cases. A GP might simply …nd it more di¢ cult to deny patients he knows well a sickness certi…cate. In the context of our theoretical model, this e¤ect could be interpreted as the GP acting more altruistic towards patients when there is higher familiarity between physician and patient, as would be the case in the context of patient choice ( = 1).
All else equal, the 'familiarity e¤ect'might create a bias in the direction of lower sick-listing rates at emergency centres, counteracting the aforementioned patient selection bias. Notice, however, that the potential bias due to familiarity between physician and patient is in principle the same for both types of GPs (…xed salary and fee-for-service). The fact that we …nd a considerably stronger response to competition for fee-for-service GPs than for …xed-salary GPs suggests, in light of our theoretical model, that our results cannot be fully explained by such a bias.
However, we can address this issue more closely by restricting our sample to consultations involving only GPs with new practices, which we de…ne as practices that have been run by the GP for at most 12 months. Since the number of GP practices within the NHS is regulated, these 'new practices' are mainly existing practices that have been taken over by another GP when the GP previously running the practice retired, moved, or for other reasons decided to
give up the practice. In these cases, the GP who takes over the practice inherits the patient list of the previous GP. At least for the …rst few months, the degree of GP-patient familiarity in new practices should be very low. Thus, by restricting the sample to consultations involving GPs with new practices, it is reasonable to assume that we reduce any potential familiarity bias to the point where it becomes negligible. Descriptive statistics of this sample are presented in Table A .4 in the Appendix.
[ Table 5 here]
In Table 5 we report the results from the estimation of (23) using the above described sample. We see that the e¤ect of competition on GPs with fee-for-service contracts is still highly signi…cant and very similar in magnitude compared with the result from the main analysis (Table 4 ). In contrast, the point estimate for …xed-salary GPs is somewhat reduced and also loses its statistical signi…cance. These results suggest that, at least for GPs on fee-for-service contracts, our main results are not biased by any di¤erences in GP-patient familiarity between GPs working in their own practice and in PCECs. If there is such a bias, it seems to a¤ect almost exclusively the …xed-salary GPs, although the loss of statistical signi…cance might be explained by the relatively low number of observations.
The remaining two potential biases that work in the same direction as the familiarity bias are the following. First, since sickness certi…cates are issued with a certain time limit, which can often be quite restricted, a certain share of the total patient mass, in particular those with a more long-term disease, might visit a GP simply to have their sickness certi…cate renewed. If, for a given sickness episode, the probability of having a sickness certi…cate renewed is higher than the probability of obtaining the …rst sickness certi…cate, and if renewals of sickness certi…cates mainly take place at a regular GP practice, this could create a bias in the direction of higher sick listing by regular GPs, implying that our competition e¤ects might be overestimated.
Second, there might be cases where a GP at an emergency centre asks the patient to visit her regular GP in order to get a sickness certi…cate. Such cases might potentially arise if the sickness certi…cation decision is a borderline one, where the emergency centre GP is more comfortable leaving this decision to the patient's own GP. This e¤ect, if it exists, might also contribute to our competition e¤ects being overestimated.
[ Table 6 here]
The former potential bias can be dealt with by excluding consultations involving patients who were already on sick leave at the time of the consultation, while the latter bias can be dealt with by excluding consultations where the same patient visits a regular GP within a short period (three days) of visiting an emergency centre. 36 The results from estimations of (23) with these sample restrictions are given in Table 6 . The point estimates reported in Column 2 are highly signi…cant and almost identical in magnitude to the ones reported in Table 4 for the same model, which suggests that the latter bias is negligible. On the other hand, the estimated coe¢ cients in Column 1 are somewhat reduced in magnitude, suggesting that our main results might be slightly biased by including patients already on sick leave. Still, though, the e¤ects of exposure to competition are relatively large, very precisely estimated, and signi…cantly larger for fee-for-service GPs than for …xed-salary GPs.
Heterogeneous e¤ects
Our empirical strategy is based on the assumption that the main di¤erence between emergency centre consultations and regular GP consultations, that is not controlled for in our empirical model, is the di¤erence in GP-patient 'matching technology'for the two types of consultations, which implies that GPs are exposed to competition when they work in their own practice but not when they work at an emergency centre. If this assumption is correct, we would expect to …nd stronger e¤ects of competition in situations where the competition intensity (or the scope for competition) is higher. We assess the validity of our key identifying assumption by de…ning di¤erent measures of competition intensity. These measures are endogenous to GP behavior, we argue, and therefore yield biased estimates of the e¤ect of competition. Still, as long as they re ‡ect competition intensity in a consistent manner, they are useful as a check of whether GPs respond more strongly to competition when competition is intense rather than slack.
The …rst measure is based on the degree of patient choice in local GP markets. All else equal, it seems reasonable to assume that competition is more intense in larger municipalities with more GPs than in smaller municipalities with fewer GPs to choose from. We therefore perform two sets of regressions, estimating (23) on two di¤erent sub-samples de…ned according to whether the consultations take place in municipalities where the number of GP practices is above or below the average (10 GP practices) or the median (5 GP practices). 37 Notice that the number of GP practices in each municipality is set by a national regulator and is therefore exogenous to GP behaviour. The results are reported in Table 7 and show, reassuringly, that the e¤ects of competition are much stronger in above-average (or above-median) municipalities.
Furthermore, the di¤erence in the e¤ect of competition between fee-for-service and …xed-salary
GPs is much higher in larger municipalities with enhanced patient choice.
[ Table 7 here]
One potential objection to using the number of GP practices per municipality as a proxy for the patients'choice set is that a higher number of GPs does not necessarily increase patient choice if these GPs are capacity constrained. Thus, it might be argued that the relevant measure . 38 The results are reported in Table 8 and are very similar to the ones based on the number of GPs.
[ Table 8 here]
We have also done the same analysis using only consultations involving GPs with new practices (as de…ned in the previous subsection). By using only GPs with an 'inherited'patient list, we reduce endogeneity related to the number of open patient lists as a measure of competition intensity, and, furthermore, we reduce potential biases related to GP-patient familiarity, as previously discussed. Table A .5 in the Appendix displays results equivalent to those in Table 7 and 8 using this more restricted sample. 39 Interestingly, and reassuringly, the results are very strong and consistent. For GPs on …xed-salary contracts, there are no signi…cant e¤ects of competition in any of the two sub-samples. On the other hand, for GPs on fee-for-service contracts, there is no signi…cant e¤ect of competition in below-average municipalities but a strong and highly signi…cant competition e¤ect in above-average municipalities.
Another potential measure of the scope for competition is based on individual GP practice characteristics, more precisely whether the GP's patient list is full or not. As illustrated by our theoretical model, if competition leads to higher sick-listing rates, as we …nd in our empirical analysis, this result is driven by each GP's desire to attract more patients. Since it is only possible for GPs with open patient lists to attract new patients, we would expect that the e¤ect of competition is primarily driven by the behaviour of these GPs. 40 However, a naïve comparison of competition e¤ects for GPs with open versus closed patient lists is susceptible to an obvious endogeneity problem, since a closed patient list might be a result of high demand because of a lenient sick-listing practice. Once more, we can deal with this endogeneity by considering only GPs with new practices, whose current demand does not depend on previous behaviour (by the same GP).
[ Table 9 here]
In Table 9 we report the results from estimating (23) with more scope for competition. We take these results as con…rmation of the validity of our empirical strategy for identi…cation.
A placebo test
Our empirical identi…cation strategy is based on the assumption that GPs have incentives to behave di¤erently when GP-patient matching is based on patient choice than when it is random.
In other words, GPs have incentives to adopt a di¤erent practice style towards patients in their own practice than towards randomly matched patients at an emergency centre. However, this logic does not apply in cases where a randomly matched patient at an emergency centre happens to be one of the GP's own list patients. In these cases, it is reasonable to assume that the GP's behaviour might a¤ect the patient's decision to remain on the GP's list, and that the GP takes this into account in the sick-listing decision. Thus, all else equal, we would not expect GPs'behaviour towards their own list patients to depend on the physical premises in which the consultations takes place (own GP practice versus emergency centre), which is why consultations with the GP's own list patients at emergency centres were excluded from the main sample.
In order to test the above logic, we restrict our sample such that consultations at emergency centres only include the GPs'own list patients and re-estimate (23) using this restricted sample.
As argued above, this sample restriction should in principle eliminate the competition e¤ect and we can therefore interpet it as a placebo test of our identi…cation strategy. If, by using this restricted sample, we obtain results similar to the ones reported in Table 4 , then our main results must be explained by some other (unobserved) di¤erences between the two consultation types that are not related to competition. 41 4 1 Notice that our results in Section 8.2 (Table 5 ) rule out 'familiarity bias' as a potential explanation of our 29
[ Table 10 here]
Estimation results from the restricted sample (using both GP and patient …xed e¤ects) are presented in Table 10 . We see that the di¤erence in sick-listing probabilities for the two consultation types vanishes for …xed-salary GPs and is dramatically reduced (from 12 to 3 percentage points) for fee-for-service GPs. These results serve as added con…rmation that our identi…cation strategy is capturing a competition e¤ect with a fairly high degree of precision. It is also quite plausible that the remaining di¤erence (of 3 percentage points) in sick-listing rates between GP practice consultations and PCEC consultations can be explained by the fact that a GP working at an emergency centre might not always recognise his own list patients when they are randomly allocated to him. A failure to recognise own list patients should be particularly likely for GPs with relatively large patient lists. We explore this hypothesis by splitting the sample of consultations (from which the results in Table 10 are derived) according to whether the GPs'actual list size is above or below the average list size (1350 patients). The estimated results from these two sub-samples are presented in the second and third columns of Table 10 and show that, although the estimated coe¢ cient is (weakly) signi…cant for fee-for-service GPs in both subsamples, the magnitude of the coe¢ cient is smaller for GPs with shorter patient lists, which serves as partial con…rmation of our hypothesis.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we study the impact of competition among physicians on their service provision, and how this relationship depends on …nancial incentives. Despite the fact that almost every country has a market-based allocation of physician services, compelling empirical evidence on the e¤ects of competition is sparse. A key challenge is to obtain exogenous variation in the degree of competition in physician markets. In this paper we address this challenge by exploiting the fact that many GPs, in addition to their regular practice, work in primary care emergency centres. This allows us to observe the same GP in two di¤erent competitive environments: (i) with competition (regular practice) and (ii) without competition (emergency centre). Thus, our empirical strategy is to exploit within-GP variation in the degree of competition, using the GP's main results.
30 service provision at the emergency centre as a benchmark to identify the e¤ect of competition.
From rich administrative data with detailed patient level information in Norway over nine years (2006 to 2016), we select a sample of the ten most frequent acute diagnoses treated by
GPs. As outcome variable we use the GPs'propensity to certify (paid) sick leave to patients, which is a highly frequent and standardised 'treatment'for acute diagnoses. Our main empirical …nding is that GPs are more likely to issue sickness certi…cates to patients that visit them at their regular practice than at the emergency centre. The strength of this e¤ect depends crucially on the GPs'…nancial incentives. Estimates from our preferred empirical model show that GPs with a volume-based (i.e., combination of fee-for-service and capitation) contract are 12 percentage points more likely to o¤er a sick leave to their patients in their regular practice than at the emergency centre. For GPs with …xed-salary contracts, the corresponding …gure is only 7.5 percentage points. We therefore conclude that exposing GPs to competition has a positive impact on their propensity to sick list patients, which is strongly reinforced by highpowered volume-based …nancial incentives. These results accord with the predictions from a dynamic model of semi-altruistic physicians who face demand that evolves over time depending on their chosen practice styles (i.e., their leniency towards issuing sickness certi…cates).
Although our empirical strategy allows us to identify exogenous variation in the degree of physician competition, a remaining challenge is to control for other factors (than competition) that may a¤ect the GPs'service provision in the two competitive environments. The detail and richness of our data allow us to estimate a high-dimensional …xed e¤ect model controlling for (observed and unobserved) time-invariant patient, GP and diagnosis heterogeneity, in addition to a wide set of observable patient and GP characteristics. In order to deal with potential estimation biases stemming from any remaining (time-variant) heterogeneity, we …rst establish the likely direction of the most obvious bias, namely that patient severity is likely to be higher at emergency centres than at GP practices, all else equal. This suggests that we underestimate the true e¤ects of competition and therefore serves as a validation of the qualitative nature of our results. As a further validation, we carefully re-estimate our empirical model varying the sample selection criteria in order to account for any conceivable remaining biases caused by unobserved heterogeneity. Reassuringly, our main results hold up well when being exposed to such a falsi…cation exercise. However, absence of competition may also involve adverse treatment e¤ects, for instance due to low diagnosing e¤orts by GPs.
The above discussion illustrates a more general insight, namely that non-price competition can be excessive and lead to overutilisation of resources, from a social welfare perspective, when the costs of these resources are not fully internalised in the market. In the case of sick listing, the costs are not (fully) borne by either the physician or the patient. In general, the potential for competition-driven overutilisation of resources exists for any non-price dimension along which physicians compete. Our empirical results indicate that the e¤ect of competition on physician behaviour is of sizeable magnitude. Furthermore, we show that these e¤ects are signi…cantly interlinked with the …nancial incentives inherent in di¤erent physician payment schemes. These results suggest that policies towards competition and patient choice in primary care markets should be seen in conjuction with the design of the physician payment schemes, and that the appropriate policy response to adverse competition e¤ects might be to redesign payment schemes rather than to restrict patient choice.
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A complete welfare analysis of the e¤ect of physician competition requires a careful estimation on the e¤ects on expenditures and patient utility (including health outcomes and labour market productivity). Unfortunately, our data do not allow for this, so we leave this issue for future research.
Appendix List of variables
The variables used in the estimation of (23) are listed and de…ned in Table A. 1.
[ Share of consultations where patients are hospitalised Descriptive statistics for GPs with new practices 2 Visit to a GP other than the one the patient is enlisted to. 3 Emergency admission to hospital the same week as the visit to primary care physician. 4 Visit to a GP who is registered with both fee-for-service and fixed-salary contracts in the same month. 5 Visits where a patient meets her/his GP at the emergency ward. 
